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because it allows for consideration of other
factors which serve to better protect the
interests of society and of justice. Mdntyre,
309 Md. at 622, 623, 526 A.2d at 37. (citing
from Com fJ. Christmas, 502 Pa. 213, 465
A.2d 989, 992 (1983». Applying this test,
the court found that the defendant's "mere
requests to see his mother, [under] the circumstances, [did not] factually constitute
an invocation of his right to remain silent,
"nor did it invoke his right to counsel." Id
at 625, 526 A.2d at 39.
There was a lengthy and strongly worded dissent filed by Judge Adkins. The dissent argued that even if a juvenile appears
mature, etc., he cannot be held to understand the full ramifications of being
arrested. Other jurisdictions provide safeguards for juveniles including a per se rule
invalidating waivers, See, e.g., People fJ. Bur·
ton, supra and special legislation, See, e.g.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§466-136 and 466137 (West 1987). (holding inadmissible
confessions, statements or admissions
made by a juvenile unless made in the presence of a parent or guardian) Mdntyre, 309
Md. at 629, 526 A.2d at 40 (Adkins, J. dissenting). The dissent was adamant that
Mdntyre's repeated requests for his mother
should have been treated as a request for a
lawyer.
Furthermore, even by using the totality
of the circumstances test, the state failed to
show that Mdntyre had the necessary intelligence, knowledge, maturity or any previous experience with the criminal justice
system. 309 Md. at 635, 526 A.2d at 44.
The court observed that Lodo'Wski dictates
an adequate record is of utmost importance to determine if there was a constitutional waiver or. rights. Id at 636, 526 A.2d
at 44. Since the trial record was notably
scant, the dissent urged that the conviction
be reversed and a new trial be held.
The court of appeals' ruling appears to
be stating that when a juvenile is charged
as an adult, he or she will be considered an
adult even under the totality of the circumstances test. Also, the court will not
consider age by itself, but will look to
other outside factors in determining if a
valid waiver of Miranda rights has been
made.

-Robert Feldman

Booth v. Maryland: VICTIM IMPACT
STATEMENTS INADMISSABLE AT

SENTENCING HEARING IN
CAPITAL MURDER CASE
In Booth fJ. Maryland, 107 S.Ct. 2529
(1987), the Supreme Court of the United
States in a 5-4 decision, delivered by Justice
Powell, rejected the introduction of victim

impact statements (VIS) at the sentencing
phase of a capital murder trial. The Court
reasoned that such information was irrelevant to the blameworthiness of a particular
defendant and therefore violative of the
eighth- amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. In rejecting
the consideration of the VIS, the Court
invalidated a Maryland statute to the
extent that it mandated the compilation of
a VIS in all felony cases.
In Booth, the victims, Irvin and Rose
Bronstein were robbed and brutally murdered in their West Baltimore home by
John Booth and Willie Reid. Booth, a
neighbor of the elderly couple apparently
entered the home to steal money in order
to purchase heroin. Due to Booth's fear of
identification by the victims, he and Reid
gagged the Bronsteins and then stabbed
them repeatedly with a kitchen knife. Two
days later, the Bronsteins' son discovered
the bodies of his murdered parents.
A jury found Booth guilty of two counts
of first-degree murder, two counts of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery.
Prior to the sentencing phase of the trial,
the State Division of Parole and Probation
submitted a presentence report which
described Booth's background, employment history, education, and criminal
record. Pursuant to Md. Ann. Code art.
41, § 4-609(c) (1986), the presentence
report included a VIS, describing the
detrimental effects of the crime on the victim's family and society in general.
Defense counsel moved to suppress the
VIS on the ground that it was "irrelevant
and unduly inflammatory, and that therefore its use in a capital case violated the
Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." Booth. 107 S.Ct. at 2532. Denying
the motion, the trial court submitted the
information to the jury, who subsequently
sentenced Booth to death. On automatic
appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
affirmed both the conviction and the sentencing decision. Booth fJ. State. 306 Md.
172,507 A.2d 1098 (1986). The court, relying on Lodowski '0. State, 302 Md. 691, 490
A.2d 1228 (1985) concluded that the VIS
was not an arbitrary factor in the sentencing process, but rather an informative
technique by which the sentencing body
could measure the full extent of the harm
caused by the perpetrator of the crime.
The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Justice Powell distinguished between the
use of a VIS in an ordinary civil or
criminal case as opposed to the unique circumstance of a capital sentencing hearing.
A VIS, in the vast majority of cases, provides the jury with two types of informa-

tion. Initially, it describes the personal
characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crime(s) on the family.
Secondly, it sets forth the family members'
opinions and characterizations of the
crimes and the defendant. Booth, 107 U.S.
at 2533. In Booth, the VIS was based on
interviews with the Bronsteins' son,
daughter, son-in-law and granddaughter.
The interviewer, an employee of the Division of Parole and Probation, compiled the
information, comments and reactions of
the family and prepared a VIS which was
then considered by the jury during their
deliberation of Booth's sentence.
The Court, in evaluating all plausible
arguments as to the relevancy and effectiveness of the VIS, discusses several potentially unconstitutional results which
illustrated the danger of allowing juries to
consider this information. First, the Court
noted that the function of the sentencing
jury is to "express the conscience of the
community on the ultimate question of
life or death." Witherspoon 'V. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 519 (1968). In so doing, the jury
is required to focus on the particular defendant as a "uniquely individual human
bein[g]." Woodson fJ. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304 (1976). Applying this rationale, the Court explained that "the focus of
a VIS is not on the defendant, but on the
character and reputation of the victim and
the effect on his family. These factors may
be wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant. Booth,
107 S.Ct. at 2534. "Allowing the jury to
rely on a VIS therefore could result in
imposing the death sentence because of factors about which the defendant was
unaware, and that were irrelevant to the
decision to kilL" Id. Consequently, the
Court found that the nature of the information contained in a VIS created an
impermissible risk that the capital sentencing decision would be made in an arbitrary
manner.
Secondly, the Court addressed the dangers of imposing the death penalty based
ont he ability of the family members to
articulate their grief and the extent of their
loss. U[I]n some cases the victim will not
leave behind a family, or the family members may be less articulate in describing
their feelings even though their sense of
loss is equally severe." Id. The fact that the
imposition of the death penalty could turn
on such unfair distinctions posed constitutional problems for the Court.
Finally, the Court examined the difficulty of rebutting the implications of the VIS,
without shifting the focus of the sentencing hearing away from the defendant.
"Presumably the defendant would have
the right to cross-examine the declarants,
Fal~
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but he rarely would be able to show that
the family members have exaggerated the
degree of sleeplessness, depression, or emotional trauma suffered." Id.
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, relied on
Tison v. Arizona, 107 S.Ct. 1676 (1986) and
concluded that "the amount of harm one
causes does bear upon the extent of his personal responsibility." Booth, 107 S.Ct. at
2542 (emphasis added). In Tison, two
brothers who planned and assisted in their
father's escape from prison were sentenced
to death because in the course of their
escape, their father murdered four innocent poeple. Scalia's dissent pointed out
that the difference between life and death
for the two defendants was a matter
"wholly unrelated to the[ir] blameworthiness," yet they were held personally
responsible for the degree of harm that
they had caused.
The impact of this decision is so potentially far-reaching as to render the recent
"victims rights" legislation virtually
obsolete. Although Justice Powell specifically distinguishes between the use of the
VIS in capital sentencing hearings as
opposed to noncapital cases, the distinction can hardly withstand the weakest
attack on its logic. It remains to be seen
just how far the Court will go in interpreting the effects of this decision, but the
obvious implications suggest the beginnings of a new trend in "victims' rights."

- Natasha Sethi

u.s.

v. Salerno: FEDERAL BAIL
REFORM ACT DOES NOT
CONTRAVENE U_S.
CONSTITUTION
In United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct.
2095 (1987) the Supreme Court, as a matter of first impression, held that the 1984
Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.c. § 3141 et seq.,
(" Act") does not, on its face, violate either
the due process clause of the fifth amendment or the excessive bail clause of the
eighth amendment.
The Act authorizes the pretrial detention of arrestees who are charged with certain serious felonies and who are found,
after an adversary hearing, to pose a threat
to the safety of individuals or to the community.
Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafero
were arrested on March 21, 1986, on a 29
count indictment alleging various Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, mail and wire
fraud offenses, extortion and various
criminal gambling violations.
At arraignment, the government moved
to have the arrestees detained pursuant to
30-The Law Forum/Fal~ 1987

§ 3142. Section 3142 provides that an
arrestee may be held without bail if no
condition or combination of conditions
would assure appearance at trial or assure
the safety of another person or the community. The government claimed that no
condition of release would assure the safety of any person or persons in the community. § 3142(e). The government
proffered evidence which showed that
Salerno was the "boss" of the Genovese
Crime family and that Cafero was a "captain" in the family. Evidence also showed
that the two men had participated in wide
ranging conspiracies and that Salerno personally participated in two murder conspiracies.
The District Court granted the government's motion finding that the government met its burden of establishing by
clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of
release would insure the safety of the community or any person. United States v.
Salerno, 631 F.Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Both Salerno and Cafero appealed. They
contended that, to the extent the Act permits pretrial detention on the ground that
the arrestee is likely to commit future
crimes, the Act is unconstitutional on its
face.
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit agreed. It concluded
that a person could not be detained consistent with due process merely because that
person was thought to present a danger to
the community. United States v. Salerno,
794 F.2d 64 (2nd Cir. 1986). The Second
Circuit reasoned that the system of
government in the United States holds persons accountable for past actions, and not
anticipated future actions. The government appealed.
The Court, with Chief Justice Rehnquist
speaking for the majority, began by stating
that because respondents had challenged
the Act on its face, they bore the burden
of showing that the Act could not pass
constitutional muster under any set of circumstances.
The fact that the Bail Reform Act
might operate unconstitutionally
under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it
wholly invalid... Schall v. Martin,
[467 U.S. 253 (1984)].

United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct at 2100.
The Court first addressed respondent's
challenge (if the Act as violative of both
substantive and procedural due process.
"Substantive due process" prevents the
government from engaging in conduct that
"shocks the conscience," Roehm v. Cali·

fornia, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), or interferes with rights "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325-326 (1937). United States
v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101.
Respondent's main contention under
"substantive" due process was that the Act
authorized impermissible punishment
before any adjudication of guilt. The
Court rejected this premise, stating that
"[t]he mere fact that a person is detained
does not inexorably lead to the conclusion
that the government has imposed punishment." Id. at 2121, quoting Bell v. WolfISh,
441 U.S. 520, 532 (1979).
In determining whether the detention is
punitive or regulatory, the Court fashioned the test " 'whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may
rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and whether it ,appears excessive in relation to the alternativt purpose assigned [to
it].' " Ibid., quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza·
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963);
United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101.
Applying this test, the Court concluded
that the detention imposed falls on the
regulatory side of the dichotomy, thus no
infringement of due process exists.
The legislative history of the Bail Reform Act clearly indicates that Congress did not formulate the pretrial
detention provisions as punishment
for dangerous individuals. See S. Rep.
No. 98-225, p. 8. Congress instead perceived pretrial detention as a potential
solution to a pressing societal problem.
Id. at 4-7.

United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101.
The Court re-enforced the conclusion
that the Act was regulatory by focusing on
the limited circumstances with which a
person may be detained. Section 3142(F)
allows for detention only in cases involving crimes of violence, offenses which the
crime is life imprisonment or death,
serious drug offenses, or repeat offenders.
Furthermore, the Speedy Trial Act, 18
U.S.c. §3161, remains in effect. United
States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101.
Also persuasive to the Court was the
long line of decisions which upheld the
government's authority to invade an individual's interest in liberty. In each of those
cases, the Court found the government's
interest in detention compelling. In the
instant case "[t]he government's interest in
preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling." By enacting the
Bail Reform Act, Congress made specific
findings that individuals on bail awaiting
trial "are far more likely to be responsible
for dangerous acts in the community after

